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Reﬂections on Liberalism, Policulturalism, and ID-ology:
Citizenship and Difference in South Africa
JEAN and JOHN COMAROFF
University of Chicago
ABSTRACT: How do nation-states in the twenty-ﬁrst century, nation-states increas-
ingly forced to come to terms with the ethnic heterogeneity of their citizens, deal with
the problem of cultural difference? How, in particular, does the Constitution of
post-apartheid South Africa — widely believed to be the most enlightened in the
contemporary world, the most tolerant of diversity — strike a balance between the ‘One
Law’ of ‘The Nation’ and the plurality of customary beliefs sustained, as a matter of
right, by the various peoples who make up this postcolony? What happens, in the
course of everyday existence, when Constitution and Custom appear to contradict one
another — and to do so in such a manner as to raise questions of basic human rights,
of freedom of belief, even of life-and-death? These questions are addressed in the paper
through a critical, broadly situated analysis of the confrontation between the Consti-
tution of South Africa and the Kingdom of Custom that continues to prevail in one of
its provinces, the North West. By exploring a complicated case that drew the State, via
its Human Rights Commission, into open conﬂict with a Tswana chiefdom—acase
about death rituals argued, before a high court judge, in the lexicon of modern
jurisprudence — it shows how a ‘living constitution’, tolerant of everyday ambiguity,
is being forged in the space of strategic engagement opened up by the alternative
languages and cultures of legality that exist in this ‘policultural’ postcolony. And in
others like it.
Prolegomenon
Herewith two fragments from the discourses of the recent South African past.
…w eBlacks (most of us) execrate ethnicity with all our being.
Desmond Tutu, 1981
1
For the Archbishop, in short, ‘native’ cultural identities were little more than an
excrescence of colonial racism.
Our duty is to identify and deﬁne the main currents of [African]
tradition and to incorporate [them] in the modern, technically advanced
political entities that we are seeking to construct.
Penuell Maduna, 1999
2
For the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, the products of
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those very identities are a necessary element in the making of the postcolonial
nation-state.
The difference? Twenty years or so in the history of difference.
If Kymlicka and Norman (2000, p. 1) are right, recent debate in political
philosophy has been preoccupied by two, typically unconnected, issues: ‘min-
ority rights-multiculturalism’ and the nature of democratic citizenship. This
seems unsurprising in an intellectual endeavour devoted largely to the study
of Western polities; after all, the triumphal rise of neoliberal capitalism, new
patterns of mass migration, and emergent ethnic and religious movements
have all put pressure on the nation-state in its modernist form. But how salient
are these issues outside EuroAmerica? How signiﬁcant are they in everyday
realpolitik across the planet? On the face of it, they might appear not to be
especially pressing in post-apartheid South Africa. Why not? Because this
country, lately freed from the ethnically-coded rule of a racist colonial state, has
fashioned for itself a Constitution founded on the most comprehensive, most
liberal, most enlightened notions of democratic pluralism. Not only is that
Constitution unusually attentive to universal enfranchisement and human
rights. It is also quite explicit in its accommodation of the cultural claims of
minorities. Indeed, if its own rhetorical construction were a description of its
political sociology, South Africa — deeply committed to the rule of law, to the
monopoly of the state over the legitimate means of violence, to a conception of
citizenship that both transcends and tolerates diversity — would seem to
inhabit the very ideal of the Euro-nation in its twenty-ﬁrst century guise. On
one hand, it embodies all the principles on which that nation was founded (see
Hobsbawm, 1992, pp. 3–4); on the other, it has set about confronting the
realities of difference in precisely the manner that many philosophers of
‘minority-rights multiculturalism’ have proposed.
And yet, almost from the start, a ‘crisis of culture’, a counter-politics of
ethnic assertion against the jurisdiction of the state, has rumbled beneath the
surface of the new polity, threatening to disrupt the founding premises of its
Bill of Rights. This has entailed more than just a quest for the recognition of
distinctive identities, languages, and life-ways, a quest that has become familiar
elsewhere in recent years (Taylor, 1992). It has also raised fundamental ques-
tions of sovereignty: the sovereignty of African traditional governance and the
kingdom of custom, in which ethnic subjects claim, and are claimed by, another
species of authority. This authority, as we shall see, does not live easily with
the hegemony of the liberal modernist state. It sanctions alternative orders of
law and justice, of the use of force, of responsibilities and entitlements, even of
tribute and taxation. The generic citizen of postcolonial South Africa may be
the rights-bearing individual inscribed in the new Constitution; also the rights-
bearing individual — typically urban, cosmopolitan — presumed in much
mass-mediated discourse. By contrast, ethno-polities and traditional leader-
ship
3 speak the language of subjects and collective being (see Mamdani, 1996).
For many — perhaps most — South Africans, it is the co-existence of the two
tropes, of citizen and subject, that conﬁgures the practical terms of national
belonging. But that coexistence, despite the Bill of Rights, does not always
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citizen and life as ethnic subject are as likely to run up against one another —
often in contradictory ways — thus making political personhood a fractured,
fractal experience. It is when they do that the realsociology of citizenship in the
‘new’ South Africa is most put to the test of democratic pluralism: citizenship
not as it is envisaged in a political philosophy of the normative future, but
citizenship in the concrete politics of a lived present.
The question of the postcolonial political subject, then, is not merely relevant
to the construction of the ‘new’ South Africa. It is crucial. But what light might
this history-in-the-making shed on philosophical debates about citizenship and
difference? How might it inﬂect a discourse that is heavily prescriptive and, as
a matter of course, continues to frame the problem of political personhood, tout
court,i nEuromodernist terms? True, it has become a progressive commonplace
to insist that ‘multiculturalism’ has to be interrogated in its empirical particular-
ity, that it takes diverse, labile forms, that liberal democracies ought to — some
would say, can — be capacious enough to accommodate it (Modood, 2000;
Levy, 2000; Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). Still, while this may complicate
matters productively, it leaves untheorised the most critical issue of all. What
happens when a liberal democracy encounters a politics of difference that it
cannot embrace ethically or ideologically within its deﬁnition of the common-
weal, a politics of difference that is not satisﬁed with recognition, tolerance, or
even a measure of entitlement—apolitics of difference that appeals to the law
or to violence to pursue its ends, among them the very terms of its citizenship?
Which, to be sure, is occurring more and more across the world in the early
years of the new century.
This last question presupposes others: why has citizenship come to capture
the imagination, popular as well as academic, at this particular time, a time
when the modernist nation-state, and the modes of representational politics
that it has long presumed, are profoundly in question? Like ‘civil society’ (see
Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999b), which has enjoyed a similar renaissance of
attention since the late 1980s, the manner in which the concept is deployed is
often as vacuous as it is appealing; indeed, there seems to be a more-or-less
proportional relationship between its vacuity and its mass appeal. Why, more
and more, are contests over fractal identities and the terms of national belong-
ing fought out by means of legalities? Might it be here, and in other sites of
contestation, rather than in the realm of theory-making or policy prescription,
that we may discern the emergence of pragmatic resolutions to the paradoxes of
citizenship in polities founded on endemic, irreducible difference?
It is these concerns, these questions, that frame our narrative here. Also the
argument we seek to make. Brieﬂy stated, it is that, in postcolonies, which are
endemically heterogeneous, citizenship always exists in an immanent tension
with policulturalism; note the term, we shall explain it below. As a result, it is
a terrain on which increasingly irreconcilable, fractal forms of political being,
embodied in self-deﬁned aggregates of persons, may seek to open up possibil-
ities for themselves, possibilities in pursuit of their passions, principles, ideals,
interests. Indeed, it is on this terrain that the modernist sense of ideology gives
way to ID-ology, the quest for a collective good, and sometimes goods,
sanctioned by, and in the name of, a shared identity. And, in the process, both448 Jean and John Comaroff
the liberal modernist polity and the kingdom of custom are transformed. The
term, ID-ology, note, is not ours: it derives from public discourse in South
Africa itself. Argue Rapule Tabane and Feriale Haffajee, in a newspaper
report,
4 the Age of Ideology, ‘of genuinely competing ideas’, is over, killed off
by a mix of world-historical and local conditions. In its place has arisen a
depoliticising kind of ‘mongrel politics’ in which party platforms tend to
converge, in which charismatics crystallise their popularity into ‘customized
political brands’, in which differences are conﬁned largely to the implemen-
tation of policy and the distribution of material advantage (see Comaroff and
Comaroff, 2000). In the upshot — this is us now, not Tabane and Haffajee —
political belonging, and the contradictions implicit in it, become, above all else,
a site of ID-ology, a site in which various sorts of identity struggle to express
themselves in the politics of everyday life.
A ﬁnal note here. While we phrase our argument with respect to South
Africa — and, more generally, to postcolonies — what we shall have to say
applies, increasingly, to the nation-state form. Why? Because one of the effects
of neoliberal capitalism, and of the kinds of human ﬂow that it generates, is to
make polities, with few exceptions, ever more diverse, ever more prone to a
politics of difference that, in the end, is likely to run up against the limits of
liberal citizenship. Not all in the same ways, of course. But in some or other
way. Which is why the postcolony is so often a harbinger of histories yet to
happen.
First, though, to histories that have happened. And are happening.
Constituting the Problem, Problematising the Constitution
The Rule of Law and Dangerous Cultural Practices
The postcolonial state in South Africa, under the African National Congress,
has had no option but to take cultural difference — and especially cultural
practices deemed ‘dangerous’ — very seriously indeed. This, as we have
intimated, is because it has been confronted, repeatedly, by social practices that
ﬂy in the face of its Constitution. Thus the police have been called upon to deal
with, among other things, urban vigilante activities conducted in the name of
Muslim morality,
5 ‘alternative’ justice ostensibly exercised under the terms of
African customary law,
6 bloody culture wars in the countryside, and
witchcraft-related killings, of which there have been many since the early
1990s;
7 to wit, the ‘new’ South African Police Service has an Occult-Related
Crimes Unit that, not long ago, instituted a program to teach ofﬁcers how to
handle the forensics of crime scenes involving arcane practices.
8 For its part, the
Constitutional Court has had to deliberate, for example, on a claim, made in the
name of Rastafarian belief, to recognise the use of prohibited drugs for ritual
purposes;
9 it may well, in future, have to address such things as indigenous
norms of patrilineal inheritance (see below). And the executive has had to
respond to constant demands to permit ‘traditional’ practices now deemed
illicit. What is more, a number of Witchcraft Summits have been held since
1994 to discuss rural unrest, and the lethal forms of cultural policing occa-Citizenship and Difference in South Africa 449
sioned by it, arising out of an alleged epidemic of muti (medicine) murders
(Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999a); one such meeting, in September 1999, was
attended by prominent politicians, lawyers, and public intellectuals, including
the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki.
10 This high level of attention to the
issue is unsurprising. Not only do violent witch-purgings call into question the
terms of national law and order. They do so by means taken to be irrational,
even savage, by the cannons of enlightenment reason. As colonial rulers long
ago realised, to condone them, even tacitly, is to grant them a measure of
legitimacy.
But herein lies a paradox, the paradox, for the liberal modernist state in
postcolonial, poli-ethnic times. In an epoch in which cultural rights have come
increasingly to substitute for political and economic enfranchisement, no
government — least of all one representing African empowerment — can
afford to ignore the passions that inﬂame such forms of collective action,
especially on the part of the majority that it strives to represent.
11 In this
respect, dramatic acts like witch-burning are merely an extreme instance of the
challenge posed everywhere to the sovereignty of the state, and to the laws of
the nation, under the sign of ethnic particularity, of religion or regionalism, of
the primordial politics of tradition. The African National Congress, to be sure,
has been unable to resist, remove, or repudiate the affective appeal of cultural
difference. Not only is it invoked in the name of ethnonationalism, most
assertively by the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CON-
TRALESA), and the Zulu-centric Inkatha Freedom Party, and separatist fac-
tions of the Afrikaner right. It is keenly felt by many ordinary South Africans,
for whom ‘customary’ attachments remain strong. As a result, its mass follow-
ing notwithstanding, the ANC has had to revise the ‘post-ethnic’ universalism
to which most
12 of its leadership was once fervently committed. Always
ambivalent, at best, toward anything associated with ‘tribalism’, the liberation
movements tended, during the struggle years and after (see Lijphart, 1995,
p. 281), to dismiss culture and custom as instruments of colonial overrule —
and to see chieftaincy as highly autocratic.
13 This even as they sought to recruit
sympathetic chiefs to their cause. Recall here Desmond Tutu’s outburst against
ethnicity. Some senior ANC cadres were still openly dismissive of indigenous
authority in the late 1990s, Barbara Oomen (2002, p. 29) reminds us; President
Thabo Mbeki’s support for it, she adds, continues to seem more strategic than
intrinsic. As that support suggests, however, the regime has made audible its
public recognition of the Kingdom of Custom as part of the country’s ‘unique
mode of governance’, citing Section 12 of the Constitution as proof of its
commitment; all of which follows what Kymlicka and Norman (2000, p. 4) term
‘the clear trend throughout the Western democracies towards greater recogni-
tion of minority rights’. This volte face was particularly noticeable before the
1999 election. Since then, party representatives have taken every opportunity
—a tevents such as royal funerals in the countryside, for instance — to
persuade powerful chiefs that they, and the cultural bases of their authority,
have a secure future in government.
But the ambiguity persists. When the Local Government Municipal Struc-
tures Act (no. 117) was passed in 1999, it made provision for the division of the450 Jean and John Comaroff
entire country, including chieﬂy domains, into municipalities. Where their
realms fell into these municipalities, traditional leaders were permitted only ten
per cent representation; the Act has been amended and a White Paper on the
topic has been drafted,
14 but the role of the chiefs remains tightly restricted.
Said to be ‘above party politics’, they are expected to conﬁne themselves to,
among other things, ceremonial activities of various kinds, the administration
of customary law, and the coordination of cultural activities, including ﬁrst
fruits, rainmaking, and other ancestral rites. In addition, they are expected to
‘perform such functions as may be delegated … by a municipal council’, to
‘carry out all orders given … by competent authorities’, and to facilitate things
like ‘the gathering of ﬁrewood’.
15 Hardly the stuff, this, of plenipotentiaries. In
fact, as critics have been quick to say, there is now ‘considerable confusion as
to what exactly the[ir] constitutional recognition implies’.
16 Predictably, many
of these rulers, seeing themselves as all powerful in their realms, feel betrayed.
This was dramatically evident at a conference, organized by the Ministry of
Provincial and Local Government in August 2000,
17 to discuss ‘traditional
leadership and institutions’ with a view to producing a White Paper.
18 Assem-
bled royals, led by prominent members of CONTRALESA, declined to take
part. Demanding that the Constitution be amended to recognise their sover-
eignty, they refused to talk to anyone other than the state president. Since then
they have ridden a roller coaster. There have been times when they were sure
that government had been persuaded to do their bidding. And there have been
other times when they have declared — perhaps tactically, in order to rally
their followers — that they had ‘reached the end of the road’, that ‘there was
never an intention to accommodate [their authority in] the making of the new
South Africa’.
19 Such statements typically draw denials from the ANC —
which, in turn, adds fuel to the ongoing battle over the future of the Kingdom
of Custom.
In playing the heady game of cultural politics, then, the ANC has conjured
up a force that it is unable fully to control, a force that vitiates the very
conception of nationhood on which the authority of the state rests. In theory,
of course, it is just such contradictions that the Constitution — tacking, as it
does, between an emphasis on universal human rights, vested in individuals,
and the recognition of cultural pluralism — was designed to mediate. Public
debate in South Africa, however, has already drawn attention to ‘major
tensions’ between those of its provisions that structure a system of democrati-
cally elected representatives and those that ascribe legitimacy to the kingdom
of custom.
20 Let us pause brieﬂy to take a look at how the Constitution itself
treats the matter. This, in turn, will provide a frame for what we have to say
about the pragmatics of citizenship as a terrain on which political subjects
construct various sorts of ID-ology.
The Constitution of Dissent
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, adopted in 1996,
21 has been
accorded hallowed status in the formation of the postcolonial polity. Translated
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italics are in the original — the text is shelved, in many homes, alongside the
family bible and books of prayer. Yet, almost from the start, there have been
doubts about its ability to constitute either One Nation or One Law; these italics
are ours. Even its comprehensibility has been questioned: a mass-circulation
black newspaper in Johannesburg, for example, has referred to it as a Tower of
Babel, pointing out that its vernacular versions are utterly opaque — and,
hence, babble to those whom it was meant to enfranchise.
22
Culture is dealt with primarily in two sections of Chapter 2 of the Consti-
tution, its Bill of Rights. Section 30, Language and Culture, states that ‘everyone
has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of their
choice’; Section 31, Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Communities, adds that
nobody belonging to any such community may
be denied the right, with other members of that community, (a) to enjoy
their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and (b) to
form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations
and other organs of civil society.
But, in both cases, there is a clear constraint: these rights ‘may not be exercised
in a manner inconsistent with any [other] provision of the Bill of Rights’; in
other words, precedence is given to those provisions that protect the dignity,
equality, and freedoms — of which a very broad range is stipulated — of all
persons, without prejudice or discrimination. Even when the Constitution, in
Section 36, acknowledges that some limitations on those freedoms are ‘reason-
able and justiﬁable in an open and democratic society’, it stresses that any such
limitation is to remain bound by the Bill of Rights; as we shall see, protagonists
of the sovereignty of popular tradition and traditional authority have sought
support for their arguments in this ‘justiﬁable’ and ‘democratic’ limitation of
the universal rights of citizenship. Customary authority, note, is not embraced
in Chapter 2 itself. It appears in Chapter 12, which states, in rather bland,
summary terms, that the Constitution recognises ‘the institution, status and
role of traditional leadership, according to customary law’ — but, again, subject
to the Bill of Rights and any relevant legislation. In sum, the subservience of
cultural particularity and the kingdom of custom to the ‘One law for One
nation’ seems unambiguous.
But is it? After all, the South African Bill of Rights has been lauded, as we
have said, precisely because it does seem to acknowledge, within appropriate
limits, the entitlement of persons bound by culture, religion, and language to
be governed by their own customs. True, the collective subject invoked here is
not a group per se; the Constitution is famously silent on group rights. That
subject is an aggregate of ‘persons’. Nonetheless, the Spirit of the Law,
especially Sections 30 and 31, has justiﬁed claims to the effect that, in tra-
ditional communities where individual rights are alien, customary practice
should prevail over the Eurocentric liberalism of the Law, in the upper cases;
that, when a custom is backed by popular consensus and a clear and present
collective interest, the cultural subject should take precedence over the national
citizen. The Supreme Court of Appeal recently made a similar argument: in
Mthembu v. Letsela,i tdecided, in May 2000, that women married under African452 Jean and John Comaroff
customary law were subject to the rule of male primogeniture — and, thereby,
excluded from inheritance of matrimonial property.
23 The court declared that
the ‘interests of the community’, as expressed in its ‘mores and fundamental
assumptions’, were of paramount importance in the case. Here, in short, one of
the highest tribunals in the land found against the Bill of Rights, as convention-
ally interpreted. Or, rather, it found that there are situations in which culture
ought to limit its provisions. The judgment drew criticism from some quarters,
notably feminist. Not only did it prove that ‘the idea of equality before the law,
regardless of sex or gender, is … incompatible with certain aspects of custom-
ary law’, wrote Khadija Magardie in a widely read national newspaper, but it
was an ‘alarming precedent’ for the triumph of ‘cultural relativism’ over the
Constitution.
Magardie was correct: in this decision, the judiciary had given culture, and
the ‘interests’ of an ethnic community, priority over other provisions of the
Constitution.
24 But did it really mean that, thenceforth, cultural difference
would amount to a limitation on the Bill of Rights? And what did it really prove
about the (in)compatibility of custom with those other provisions? The evi-
dence is inconclusive. In June 2003, for instance, application was made to Judge
President John Hlophe on behalf of two orphaned girls, whose grandfather had
inherited their father’s home in Khayelitsha, on the outskirts of Cape Town,
under the terms of customary law. He promptly stated his intention to sell the
place and evict the children and their mother. Lawyers for the girls sought an
order to the effect that primogeniture under African Law and Custom, in this
case, be ‘interpreted and developed in line with the constitution, particularly
the right to dignity and the right to equality’. Or, if not, that it be declared
unconstitutional.
25 Clearly, they doubted that tradition could be rendered
compatible with the Bill of Rights — and, if it could not, wished to establish the
priority of the latter over the former. The defence, by contrast, asserted baldly
that ‘customary law was recognised in South African law and protected by the
constitution’. Hlophe reserved judgment. In doing so, he repeated the vague
and vacuous ANC mantra that tradition could, and should, be suitably up-
dated. ‘We promise to develop the law as it should be developed in 2003’, he
said.
In 2000, three years before, we had put the question of compatibility to two
constitutional court justices and received revealingly different answers. Albie
Sachs, legal theorist of the liberation movement and a signiﬁcant judicial force
in the new dispensation, saw no necessary conﬂict between the Constitution
and custom. The ﬁrst always takes precedence over the second, he said. It
provides the frame within which customary law, to the degree that it remains
relevant to everyday life, might sustain itself in a liberal democracy. If conﬂict
were to arise — as it did on the question of, say, the traditional right of males
to inﬂict punitive beatings on members of their family — it was to be
addressed by means of statutory law; vide,i nthis respect, the Domestic
Violence Act of 1999. In a public speech on the topic, Sachs (n.d., pp. 15–16) put
the question in a more nuanced light. The Constitutional Court, he said, had
left the ‘ever-developing speciﬁcs’ of customary law to future deliberation and
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in ‘organic connection with the community’. But its jurisdiction ought never to
go far beyond the resolution of family and neighbourhood disputes; even then,
traditional authorities would have to act within the limits of the Bill of Rights.
In short, there never was, nor is there now, a contradiction between culture and
the Constitution. Ethnic subject and national citizen are one and the same legal
person.
By contrast, Yvonne Mokgoro, formerly of the law faculty at the University
of Bophuthatswana, saw a palpable tension between the terms of the Consti-
tution and the kind of law implemented in traditional tribunals, most notably
in such matters as inheritance, succession, and domestic relations. In her view,
the Constitutional Court operated at a great distance from law-as-lived — and
from the policing of everyday life in the countryside. A good deal of local
practice continued in deﬁance of the Bill of Rights, she observed; it was merely
a matter of time before cases emerged that contested its Eurocentrism in the
name of cultural difference. Meanwhile, these tensions were managed, day in
and day out, in variously pragmatic ways, rendering real-law in the new South
Africa more complex and diverse than most jurists acknowledged.
26
Just how complex we shall soon see.
Before we address the real-life, pragmatically-wrought tensions between the
Constitution and the Kingdom of Custom in the ‘new’ South Africa, however,
it is necessary to offer a few generic observations about ‘the’ postcolonial
nation-state. For it is only by means of a counterpoint between the general and
the particular that we might make sense of the ways in which — here as
elsewhere — the Law for the Land and the cultural lives of its inhabitants vex
each other in arguments over sovereignty, citizenship, and the limits of liberal
democracy.
Reﬂections on the Postcolony
It became something of a commonplace in the early 1990s to observe that
‘postcoloniality’ means disparate things to different people (see Darian-Smith,
1996; McClintock, 1992): that, while it denotes temporality, it refers to more
than just the time ‘after colonialism’ (Prakash, 1995); that, in its positive voice,
it evokes subaltern, ‘oppositional consciousness’ (Klor De Alva, 1995, p. 245);
that it ‘foregrounds a politics of … struggle’ (Mishra and Hodge, 1991, p. 399).
These sorts of statements have drawn their own criticism, but that is another
matter. What is of concern here is that, in all the efforts to stress a kind of
sensibility built into ‘the’ postcolonial perspective, there has been a tendency to
treat the postcolonial nation-state as something of a theoretical cypher on
whose ground arguments about the past, about identity, citizenship, conscious-
ness, and other things, may proceed unencumbered by the facts of actual
histories, economies, or societies. Clearly, this is not the place in which to
‘theorise’ postcoloniality, sui generis, even if it were possible to do so in the
abstract. But, if sense is to be made of the emerging forms of government,
politics, and popular subjectivity in post-apartheid South Africa, or anywhere
else, a few general observations are in order.
They have to do, by and large, with hyphe-nation, with the link between454 Jean and John Comaroff
nation and state, state and nation. Some of them, perforce, reprise things we
have discussed more fully in other places (e.g. 2000, 2001).
The modernist nation — as Benedict Anderson (1983), among others, has
pointed out — was an imagined community deﬁned, putatively, by its cultural
homogeneity and its deep sense of ‘horizontal fraternity’. This imaginging, it is
often noted, was more aspiration than achievement. The European polity, after
Westphalia, was always a work-in-progress: never a singular, deﬁnite article, it
evinced a great deal of variation across time and space. Further, for all the idea
that it was composed of right-bearing persons equal before the law, it excluded
many from its politics and its commonweal — and was, typically, inhospitable
to difference. Nonetheless, the ﬁction of a unity of essence, affect, and interest,
of common purpose and civitas, mandated the legitimacy of the state as sole
guarantor of the individual entitlements and collective well-being of its citi-
zens. Hence the hyphe-nation, the indivisibility of nation from state.
Much has been said in recent times of the so-called ‘crisis’ of the modernist
polity under the impact of global capitalism: of its shrinking sovereignty; of its
loss of control over economic policy, cultural production, and the ﬂow of
people, currencies, and commodities; of a growing disjunction between nation
and state (see Appadurai, 1990). Whether or not ‘the’ nation-state is alive and
well, ailing, or metamorphosing — we prefer the third alternative ourselves —
one thing is patent. The received notion of polities based on cultural homo-
geneity and a sense of horizontal fraternity, real or ﬁctive, is rapidly giving
way to imagined communities of difference, of multiculturalism, of ID-ology.
This is true even in places as long antithetical to heterogeneity as the United
Kingdom, which, despite recent race wars on the streets of its northern towns,
now projects itself, with apologies to Benetton, as United in its tolerance of
Colour and Culture. And in ones like Botswana, long regarded, if not alto-
gether accurately, as relatively homogeneous. To be sure, the rising incidence
of cultural struggles and ethnopolitics since 1989 has called forth a torrent of
scholarly argument. There is no need to retrace that argument here. For present
purposes, we merely need to register the fact.
For most postcolonial nation-states the politics of difference is not new.
(Mark, here, the plural: the postcolony is not a singular article either; it is a
variegated species of historical formation-under-construction.) Heterogeneity
has been there from the ﬁrst. Born of long histories of colonisation, these
polities typically entered the new world order with legacies of ethnic diversity
invented or exacerbated in the cause of imperial governance. Colonial regimes,
intent on the management of racial capitalism, never constituted nations in the
Euromodernist sense of the term, even where they gave their ‘possessions’
many of the ceremonial trappings of nationhood. In their wake, they tended to
leave behind them not just an absence of infrastructure, but a heritage of
fractious difference. This has been further attenuated, since ﬁn de sie `cle,b ysome
of the cultural and material corollaries of neoliberalism: the movement across
the planet of ever more people in search of work and opportunities to trade;
the transnational mass-mediation of signs, styles, and information; the rise of
an electronic commons; the growing hegemony of the market and, with it, the
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patented, exchanged-for-proﬁt. In this world, freedom is reduced to choice:
choice of commodities, of life-ways, and, most of all, of identities. In the
upshot, the great irony, the great existential contradiction, of our times, is that
we seem to have entered an age in which identity has become, simultaneously,
a matter of volition and self-production through consumption and a matter of
ineluctable essence, of genetics and biology.
As this suggests, postcolonies evince many features common to the modern-
ist polities on which they have had, to a large degree, to model themselves. In
coming to terms with the implications of global neoliberalism, they appear, in
fact, to exaggerate — or, more accurately, hyper-extend — those features; all of
which makes it seem as if, in their temporal aspect, they are running slightly
ahead of the unfolding history of the Euromodern nation-state. Perhaps they
are harbingers of the postmodern future. But that is a topic for another time.
Our focus here is on two corollaries of the founding of postcolonies not on
homogeneity but on difference, not on deep horizontal fraternity but on a social
contract among persons who are at once right-bearing individuals and identity-
bearing subjects.
The ﬁrst corollary has directly to do with the reﬁguration of citizenship. The
explosion of identity politics after 1989, especially in postcolonies, has mani-
fested itself in more than just ethnicity. Difference is also vested, increasingly,
in gender, sexuality, generation, race, religion, life-style, and social class. And
in constellations of these things, sometimes deployed in highly contingent,
strategic ways. While most human beings continue to live as citizens in
nation-states, they tend only to be conditionally citizens of nation-states: their
composite personae may include elements that disregard political borders
and/or mandate claims against the commonweal within them. In consequence,
identity struggles of one kind or another appear immanent almost everywhere
as selfhood is immersed into collective essence, innate substance, and primor-
dial destiny (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001). What is more, the assertion of
autochthony — which elevates to a ﬁrst principle the interests, ‘natural’ rights,
and moral connectedness that arise from rootedness in a place of birth — has
become an ever more signiﬁcant mode of exclusion within national polities;
this, as Americans learned after 9/11, in proportion to the extent to which
outsiders are held to undermine the Wealth or Security of Homeland and
Nation. It is, putatively, in the name of the latter that the state is becoming a
metamanagement enterprise in the neoliberal world (loc. cit.):
27 of subjects who,
even as they seek to be global citizens in a planetary economy of commodities
and cultural ﬂows, demand also to be shareholders in the polity-as-corporation.
Herein, then, lies the complexity: the fractal nature of contemporary political
personhood, the fact that it is overlaid and undercut by a politics of difference
and identity, does not necessarily involve the negation of national belonging.
Merely its uneasy, unresolved, ambiguous co-existence with other modes of
being-in-the-world. It is this inherent ambiguity, we suggest, that makes the
ostensible concreteness of concepts like ‘citizenship’ and ‘community’ so allur-
ing.
Of the modes of being that constitute the twenty-ﬁrst century political
subject, cultural attachments are often taken, popularly, to run deepest. In456 Jean and John Comaroff
many postcolonies, they are also the most marked. As we have said, ethnicity,
like all ascribed identities, represents itself as grounded at once in blood and
sentiment, in a commonality of interest, and, by extension, in ‘natural’ right.
Add to this the fact that culture has increasingly come to be seen, and to be
legally protected, as intellectual property (see above; also Coombe, 1998) —
even more, as a ‘naturally’ copyrighted collective possession — and what is the
result? The dawn of the Age of Ethnicity, Inc. Observe, in this regard, that
several ethnic groups have formally incorporated as limited companies; that a
large number of others have established themselves as businesses to market
their heritage, their landscape, their knowledge, their religious practices,
their artefacts; that yet others have successfully sued for the unremunerated
reproduction of their symbols, sacred and secular. Thus it is that identity, in
the age of partible, conditional citizenship, is deﬁned, ever more, by the
capacity to possess and to consume;
28 that politics is treated, ever more, as a
matter of individual or collective entitlement; that social being in general, and
social wrongs in particular, are translated, ever more, into the language of
‘rights’.
Self-evidently, in this light, the term ‘multicultural(ism)’ is insufﬁcient to
describe the fractious heterogeneity of postcolonies. Demeaned in popular
usage, it evokes images of Disney’s ‘Small World’, of compendia of the Family
of Man,o fritual calendars respectful of human diversity, and the like; in short,
of benign indifference to difference. Neither as noun nor as adjective does it
make clear the critical limits of liberal pluralism: that notwithstanding the
utopian visions of some humanist philosophers, the tolerance afforded to
culture in modernist polities falls well short of allowing claims to autonomous
political power or legal sovereignty. In postcolonies, in which ethnic assertion
plays on the simultaneity of primordial connectedness, natural right, and
corporate interest, the nation-state is less multicultural than it is policultural.
The preﬁx, spelled ‘poli-’, marks two things at once: plurality and its politicisa-
tion. It does not denote merely appreciation on the part of the national majority
for the customs, costumes, and cuisine of one or another minority from one or
another elsewhere. It is a strong statement, an argument grounded in a cultural
ontology, about the very nature of the pluri-nation, about its constitution and
the terms of citizenship within it; about the spirit of its laws, about its
governance and its hyphe-nation. As we have already seen, in South Africa this
takes the form of an ongoing confrontation between Euromodern liberalism
and variously expressed, variously formulated notions of ‘traditional’ auth-
ority.
Talk of rights, of culture as intellectual property, of citizenship, constitu-
tions, and contestation, brings us to the second corollary that ﬂows from the
heterogeneous social infrastructure of postcolonies. Whether weak or strong,
intrusive or recessive, autocratic or populist, the regimes that rule them share
one thing: they speak incessantly of and for themselves in the name of ‘the’
state. Like those born of Euromodernity, postcolonial African states are state-
ments (see Corrigan and Sayer, 1985, p. 30). They give voice to more or less
authoritative worldviews, sometimes backed by military might, sometimes by
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rhetorical force. But their language is not arbitrary.
29 It is the language of the
law. The modernist polity, of course, has always been rooted in a culture of
legality. Its subject, as Charles Taylor (1989, pp. 11–12) reminds us, was, from
the ﬁrst, an individual whose humanity and dignity were formulated in the
argot of rights and legal privilege. The global spread of neoliberal capitalism
has intensiﬁed the grounding of citizenship in the jural: this because of its
contractarian conception of all relations, its celebration of ‘free’ markets, and its
commodiﬁcation of virtually everything, all of which are heavily inscribed in
the language of the law. It has also required that received modes of regulation
be redesigned to deal with new forms of property, possession, consumption,
exchange, and jurisdictional boundaries (see Jacobson, 1996; Salacuse, 1991;
Shapiro, 1993).
All of this reaches its apotheosis in postcolonies, precisely because their
hyphenation is so highly attenuated, because they are built on a foundation of
irreducible difference, because they are endemically policultural. In them, the
ways and means of the law — constitutions and contracts, rights and remedies,
statutory enactments and procedural rituals — are attributed an almost magical
capacity to accomplish order, civility, justice, and empowerment. And to
remove inequities of all kinds. Note, in this respect, how many new national
constitutions have been promulgated since 1989. Note also the explosion across
the planet of law-related NGOs — Legal Resource Centres, Lawyers for
Human Rights, and the like — whose ofﬁces are now to be found in the most
remote of African villages. In South Africa, the language of legality has become
so ubiquitous, the Constitution (in the upper case) so biblical, that virtually
every organisation has its own (lower case) analogue. There is even a Law
Train that travels around the countryside offering free legal advice; its volun-
teer lawyers take pains to encourage all citizens to pursue their rights, and to
address wrongs, by legal means.
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But why this fetishism of the law? In policultural nation-states, the language
of legality affords an ostensibly neutral medium for people of difference to
make claims on each other and on the state, to enter into contractual relations,
to transact unlike values, and to deal with their conﬂicts. In so doing, it
produces an impression of consonance amidst contrast: of the existence of
universal standards which, like money, facilitate the negotiation of incommen-
surables across otherwise intransitive boundaries. Hence its capacity, especially
under conditions of social and ethical disarticulation, to make one thing out of
many, to carve concrete realities out of fragile ﬁctions. Hence, too, its hege-
mony, despite the fact that it is hardly a guarantor of equity. As an instrument
of governance, it allows the state to represent itself as the custodian of civility
against disorder — and, therefore, as mandated to conjure moral community
by exercising a monopoly over the construction of a commonweal out of
inimical diversities of interest (Harvey, 1990, p. 108). It is this, to return to our
point of a moment ago, that is made manifest in the rash of new constitutions
written over the past decade or so. Each domesticates the global-speak of
universal human rights, an idiom that individuates the citizen and, by treating
cultural identity as a private asset rather than a collective possession, seeks to
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It is an open question whether or not these constitutions, this obsession
with human rights — indeed, the language of legality itself — yield empower-
ment to those who previously lacked it. They do not, after all, guarantee the
right to a living, only to possess, to signify, to consume, to choose. None-
theless, the alchemy of the law, like all fetishes, lies in an enchanted displace-
ment, one that resists easy demystiﬁcation: the notion, not altogether un-
founded, that legal instruments have the wherewithal to orchestrate social
harmony and, thus, to manufacture something that was not there before.
Its charm also lies in the fact that it obscures the most brutal of truths: that
power produces rights, not rights power; that law is itself a product of the
political, not a prime mover in constructing social worlds; that it, alone, is not
what separates order from chaos or an equitable society from a state of
savagery.
Put together the fetishism of the law and the policulturalism of the post-
colony, and the product seems overdetermined: a polity in which struggles
over difference — in particular, struggles over the authority to police everyday
life — tend to ﬁnd their way into the legal domain. Often, indeed, into the
dramaturgical setting of the courtroom. But here, surely, there ought to be a
rude end to our South African story. To the extent that contestations over the
right to police everyday life end up in the realm of the juridical, and to the
extent that this realm is dominated by institutions of the state, what chance
have claims made under the sign of culture and in the spirit of policulturalism
against the hegemony of the Constitution, against the Laws of the Nation,
against the ideological dominance of the universal right-bearing citizen? This
rephrases, in more general terms, a question we asked earlier. In a world
regulated by Eurocentric jurisprudence, should we not expect that any as-
sertion of Afromodernity, any argument for the sovereignty of the Kingdom of
Custom, would have little prospect of prevailing? Would not the latter simply
fade away of its own accord — or under the pressure of the former? American
critical legal theory would probably concur, given its tendency to align the law
with the power of the state. Others, like those who contend that multicultural-
ism is inimical to democracy, would hope that they were correct.
31 As we have
implied, however, the matter is not so straightforward. For one thing, phrased
thus, it presumes that law and culture — or, more accurately, European liberal
legal universalism and appeals to Africanity — exist in a zero-sum equation.
This manichean opposition, it is true, may describe the way the issue is framed
in South African popular discourse. But reality is much more complicated. The
challenge is to make sense of the ways in which the forces of tradition and
those of liberal democracy are confronting one another at the present moment;
how, in ongoing, often strident struggles, both are being transformed — thereby
altering the very shape and substance of postcolonial politics, of citizenship, of
democracy.
In order to do so, we appeal to a venerable anthropological device: an
extended case. This case is paradigmatic of encounters, in the interstices of
postcolonial constitutionalism, between the Rule of Law and the Kingdom of
Custom. It concerns a battle, in the North West Province, over the alleged
wrongs of a burial rite.Citizenship and Difference in South Africa 459
From Customs of Death to the Death of Custom
Mogaga Meets the Human Rights Commission
What happens when, as an anonymous local reporter wrote, there is a ‘head-on
collision between the new South African Constitution and [the] age-old tradi-
tions, customs and cultures observed by millions of Blacks’?
32 The answer, in
the case between Mrs Kedibone Elizabeth Tumane, of the remote village of
Mononono in the North West Province, and Chief Nyalala Pilane of the
Bgakgatla-Ba-Kgafela, under whose Tribal Authority the village falls, was a
lengthy legal tussle, notable for the complex strategies — and the appeals to
culture, the constitution, democracy, and rights — on both sides. The dispute
centred on Tumane’s refusal to perform a burial rite. At issue was a Tswana
convention that requires a newly bereaved spouse to sprinkle a herb, mogaga,
on her path when she walks abroad in communal space. In theory, death
pollution (seﬁﬁ) afﬂicts men as well as women (J. Comaroff, 1980, pp. 643–44).
But ritual prophylaxis is more stringently mandated for females, who are
thought to be more open to contamination. In the past, the rite was usually
observed for a year; in recent times, some Tribal Authorities
33 have insisted on
regulating its performance in the cause of communal well-being. Mrs Tumane,
a staunch member of the Watchtower Movement, saw mogaga as contrary to the
dictates of her faith. She claimed that, when she tried to leave home, she was
prevented from doing so by the Tribal Authority. What was more, members of
the local community, deeming her behaviour a deliberate breach of tradition,
called for her banishment. After various efforts to settle the matter had failed,
Mrs Tumane endeavoured to take Chief Pilane and his Tribal Authority to
court. With the support of the South African Human Rights Commission
(SAHRC), she complained that her human rights had been violated.
Some background here. Mortuary ritual has been a contentious issue among
Tswana since time immemorial; early missionaries were quick to recognise that
the space of death was a site of singular sensitivity (Comaroff and Comaroff,
1997b, p. 358; see Durham and Klaits, 2000). It still is. A survey in 2000 of
chieﬂy court records in the North West revealed a score of cases brought
against local people, mostly immigrants from other regions, who had refused
to perform the proper mourning routines. These are matters of great moment
because bereavement rites — the initial seclusion of surviving spouses, then the
sprinkling of mogaga to cool their polluting footprints — are held to prevent the
contagion of death from escaping abroad (J. Comaroff, 1974, 124f). In her
afﬁdavit to the High Court,
34 Mrs Tumane afﬁrmed that this is a widely shared
belief; its breach is said to threaten the lives of local cattle or to withhold the
rain. The growing impact of HIV/AIDS in the countryside has heightened such
ritual anxieties: inadequately observed mourning practices are thought to play
a role in rising mortality rates.
From this vantage, then, the performance of prescribed burial rites is not
just a question of personal choice, nor even of respect for custom: it is a matter,
literally, of life and death for the community at large — and, therefore, the
responsibility of its traditional authorities. But not everyone in the rural North
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most often mounted by women in the name of their right to freedom of belief.
Thus, in June 1995, a group of ‘concerned’ female cadres of the ANC and
Pan-African Congress presented a memorandum to the Bafokeng chief, Lebone
Motlotlegi. It protested ‘the enforcement of traditional laws’ in respect of burial
which ‘deprived South Africans of their rights to full citizenship’.
35 Citizenship,
here, denotes a speciﬁc sort of political subjectivity: equal, rights-endowed
membership within the liberal nation-state, not subjection to the Kingdom of
Custom. There was precedent, in short, for Elizabeth Tumane’s application for
an interdict to the High Court in Maﬁkeng in June 1998. She claimed that,
because of her refusal to observe mogaga,arepresentative of the Bakgatla-Ba-
Kgafela Tribal Authority had ordered her to conﬁne herself to her house and
yard, forcing her to ‘live … the life of an outcast’.
36
Tumane emerges from the story as a woman of uncommon resolve; our
informants conﬁrmed that prior religious tensions had sharpened local sensi-
tivities to her ritual infringements and had heightened antagonism toward
her.
37 Her eldest son, also a Jehovah’s Witness — another son in Mononono is
not
38 — had initially taken his mother’s grievance to the regional Ombudsman,
whose staff tried in vain to intervene with the Tribal Authority. The Human
Rights Commission
39 was the next resort. Advocate Pansy Tlakula, a Tswana-
speaking commissioner with special responsibility for the North West Prov-
ince, duly accompanied the complainant to a meeting with Chief Pilane.
Tlakula had brought veteran politician Helen Suzman and a senior male
colleague with her, suspecting that gender tensions might also be at work in
the dispute. The battle between custom and human rights has often been
reduced, in the heat of political argument, to a standoff between self-identify-
ing ‘traditional’ senior men and constitutionally empowered women and
youth; that is, between ‘subjects’ and ‘citizens’.
In an afﬁdavit sworn at Mononono, Tumane notes that, at the meeting in
June 1998, Pilane had agreed to end her conﬁnement. By then, six months of
seclusion had already elapsed; this, she added, was the prescribed length of
time, according to a prior Tribal Authority ruling, for which the sprinkling of
mogaga was compulsory. The chief had consented then to call a gathering of the
community, at which he undertook both to announce his decision to free her
and to permit the HRC to inform people of existing constitutional provisions
‘relating to customary laws and practices’.
40
The promised gathering was duly held, although the HRC was not invited.
But, rather than end Tumane’s conﬁnement, the ‘tribe’ resolved that, because of
her transgression, she should be banished from the village and the chiefdom.
Pilane kept a low proﬁle, allowing the ruler of a senior branch of the Bakgatla
in Botswana
41 to make a strong statement about the perils posed to tradition by
the South African Constitution.
42 In challenging the sovereignty of the State
and its One Law, customary authorities here presumed a political map that
transcends national borders. For her part, Tumane said that she was threatened
with assault, the volatile crowd vowing that they were ready to expel her by
force. ‘I really feared for my safety and that of my family’, she attested.
43 Efforts
by the HRC to remind the chief and the Tribal Authority of their earlier
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to end the conﬁnement. Tumane was ‘conﬁned by her own custom’, he wrote;
this could not be changed without the ‘consent of the tribe’,
44 of which she
herself was a member.
45 Her rights had been respected, he went on, save where
they were in conﬂict with Section 36 of the Constitution, ‘which [wa]s appli-
cable in all black South African communities’. Section 36, recall, is the clause
covering the limitation of rights. Here it was invoked to justify the suspension
of a constitutional entitlement where it conﬂicted with a collectively endorsed
custom.
Tumane and the HRC countered that Pilane and the Tribal Authority had
violated Tumane’s constitutional rights: her right to equality (Section 9),
dignity (Section 10), security of person (Section 12[1]), freedom of religion,
belief and opinion (Section 15), freedom of movement and residence (Section
21), choice of language and culture (Section 30), and just administrative action
(Section 33). While the Kgatla were entitled to promote the religion and culture
of their community, went the argument, they could do so only in a manner
consistent with the Bill of Rights. An urgent court application was made and,
on 20 July 1998, the Mmabatho High Court ruled it a violation of the
Constitution to compel performance of the mogaga rite. Pilane was ordered to
lift Tumane’s conﬁnement immediately, and to desist from threatening her in
any way.
The order was an interim measure, pending a court hearing in November
of that year. According to Advocate Tlakula, who litigated on behalf of the
HRC, it had no appreciable effect on Tumane’s predicament. Meanwhile, the
dispute became a cause ce ´le `bre in the North West. Reporters who travelled to
Mononono to interview Tumane wrote that she was relieved at the prospect of
being released from ‘house arrest’.
46 The case was also debated in the provin-
cial House of Traditional Leaders, where the chiefs came into bitter confron-
tation with both the MEC
47 for Local Government, a senior ANC politician, and
representatives of the HRC; they argued that the challenge to Chief Pilane was
part of a general campaign to ‘violate’ tradition in the name of the Constitution.
Why were the customary rights of tribes not protected by that Constitution?
Why were the rights of individuals put above those of groups? Why was it that
this case was being debated in the High Court rather than in the House of
Traditional Leaders?
48
In November, Pilane submitted a long answering afﬁdavit.
49 The text, which
repeats some of his earlier arguments, begins with a history of the Bakgatla-Ba-
Kgafela, seeking to establish that its leader ‘owed [his] position entirely to the
support [he] had within [the tribe], inspired by its history, culture and
traditions’. Signiﬁcant among these traditions were rituals of birth, marriage,
and death; rituals, like the use of mogaga, that enjoyed ‘almost complete’
observance among the Kgatla, irrespective of education or status. In words that
might have been written by structural-functionalist anthropologists of the
British School, the ruler declared: ‘Tradition is the glue that holds the tribe
together, gives it a purpose, sustains its identity and allows for co-ordination
and co-operation in … efforts [toward upliftment]’. While virtually all Kgatla
regarded themselves as Christians, he went on, only a few, notably Jehovah’s
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which biblical injunction forbad the custom, so that ‘some compromise’ could
be reached, had been unsuccessful. So had attempts to get those churches that
opposed it to produce their constitutions; a clear example, this, of the power of
constitutionalism, in the lower case (see above).
50 Pilane, here, gestures toward
an accommodation between the Constitution and culture, an accommodation
actively encouraged by the HRC, which advocates the ‘modernisation and
amendment’ of traditional practices in line with the Bill of Rights. But again,
the gesture remains entirely rhetorical: what a ‘compromise’ might actually
have meant, in this case, seems not to have been seriously considered by any
of the parties.
51
In addressing Tumane’s claims in particular, however, Pilane’s afﬁdavit
abruptly changed direction, asserting that she had never been threatened or
intimidated by his Authority. Mogaga, he now insisted, was a ‘ritual voluntarily
followed … [T]here has been no compulsion’. The complainant had, by her
own choice, dissociated herself from the life of the village. This was her right.
But, to the degree that she showed ‘contempt for tradition in the language of
religious fervour and self-righteous indignation’, her actions were ‘calculated
to cause an affront to [local] dignity’.
52 Tumane was an ‘eccentric’ who had
chosen to marginalise herself; she was now feeling the hostility of ‘the tribe as
a community’ — not least for dragging them into expensive litigation. What is
more, the effort of the HRC to turn a ‘non-issue’ into a ‘human rights’ case had
backﬁred. The complainants had sought to demonise an unobjectionable rite in
the hope of forcing it to ‘adapt’ under the pretext that it infringed the
Constitution. In joining the dispute, the HRC had made clear its contempt for
the Kgatla and their customs.
Athough the thrust of this afﬁdavit was to deny that the mogaga rite was
binding — or that Mrs Tumane had actually been conﬁned by it — Pilane’s
conclusions suggested otherwise. For, in closing, he reiterated that he was
merely ‘chief by virtue of the decision … of the tribe’ and was, therefore,
powerless to impose decisions that ran counter to the democratic voice of
popular opinion. That opinion, he did not have to repeat, had been strongly in
favour of punishing Elizabeth Tumane. Rulers who had deﬁed their people in
the past, he reminded the court, had usually come to grief.
This was the last salvo ﬁred by Chief Pilane in the conﬂict. It was deﬁnitive.
On 25 February 1999, the High Court dismissed its decree nisi of the previous
July on the ground that the disputed practice had been declared voluntary. By
this time, anyway, the required period of mourning had long elapsed.
Advocate Tlakula told us that the HRC had indeed been interested in the
constitutional issues raised by Mrs Tumane’s suit. In fact, the Commission
regretted that Pilane had not stuck to his guns: that he had not made the
strongest case for the sovereign cultural rights — or prescribed customary rites
—o fethnic communities. Tlakula had anticipated an argument to the effect
that Tumane lived voluntarily among Bagkgatla and was thus bound by their
life-ways. As she noted, there is precedent for the judiciary favouring tradition
over human rights; the Supreme Court, remember, was to give priority to
culture over gender equality in Mthembu v. Letsela. Tlakula said that she had
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to Pilane’s lawyers in the hope that they would mount the most forceful
defence possible, thereby ensuring that the matter would be thrashed out in
court. The HRC wanted very much to win a landmark ruling that would
render it unconstitutional to force anyone to abide by a sectarian cultural
practice. To be sure, even this would have been a limited victory: Tlakula had
planned to base her counter-argument on Tumane’s right to freedom of
association rather than her freedom of belief; she sought to avoid pitting
‘religion’ against ‘culture’, with all the complexities that this would inevitably
have introduced. Above all — and here is clear evidence of how the politics of
difference challenges the liberal rule of law — the Commission was anxious not
to assert that ‘African culture was unconstitutional’. It is one thing to outlaw
compulsion, quite another to criminalise custom.
But the HRC lost its chance. Rightly or not, the chief’s lawyers had told him
that — in view of the weight accorded to the Bill of Rights in the ‘new’ South
Africa — he was bound to lose unless he declared that the mogaga rite was
voluntary; a strategic retreat would, in any case, leave the legal status of
custom advantageously murky. This tactical caution might have been justiﬁed,
albeit for different reasons: Tlakula believed that Kgatla opinion was more
divided than Pilane had allowed. Journalists, who interviewed local people,
concurred:
53 Tumane had been quietly abetted by many of her neighbours.
As is common in such cases, the public was invoked on all sides, most
notably by the chief. Pilane had asserted, early on, that Mrs Tumane was
conﬁned by ‘her own custom’, that it was beyond his power to release her from
her duty to follow a popularly mandated tradition. While his disavowal of
authority was somewhat disingenuous, the ruler’s testimony rested on two
broadly endorsed claims: ﬁrst, that neglect of rites like mogaga is regarded by
the majority of rural people as a clear and present danger to their physical and
moral well-being; and, second, that the obligation to perform this particular rite
had been legitimately afﬁrmed by a democratic process, the Kgatla nation
(setshaba) having voiced unanimous support for it in a public setting. In its
discussion of the case, the House of Traditional Leaders in the North West
Province had explicitly demanded more recognition for the legitimacy of
collectively afﬁrmed traditions and modes of governance. In so doing, it echoed
a widespread sentiment in the countryside about the need to ‘Africanise’
democracy by rescuing it from Eurocentric preoccupations with electoral
processes and individual rights.
As we have seen, the chief opted for strategic compromise in his ﬁnal
afﬁdavit. But, in his substantive statements, he returned repeatedly to the
affront implied by cases like this to the integrity of Kgatla culture. Tellingly, his
argument for the sovereignty — some would say fetishism — of custom
reproduced the language of the Constitution: it was framed in terms of rights,
freedom, dignity, and democracy. However, this language was used to evoke
a very different vision of persons, polities, and politics, one that distinguishes
ethnic subjects from national citizens; this in spite, or maybe because, of the fact
that the two visions serve to deﬁne and limit one another — and that, in
practice, neither is as distinct from the other as is often made out in the heat
of dispute.464 Jean and John Comaroff
Little wonder, then, that the ‘mogaga case’, as it is now known in the North
West, has become exemplary of the entrenched contradiction between the One
Law of the Nation and the Kingdom of Custom. Signiﬁcantly, the conﬂict had
no decisive outcome. The antinomy to which it spoke remains unresolved. And
unresolvable. Mrs Tumane lives on in Mononono — released, in the end, not
by the court but by the passage of time. Other widows since have either
performed the rite or desist less visibly. The dispute to which it gave rise, and
many others like it, make three things clear. The ﬁrst is the growing relevance,
in this postcolonial democracy, of ethnically-based arguments about rights and
entitlements, arguments that frame local struggles against the authority of the
state not merely in cultural terms, but with reference to a form of policultural-
ism that is making itself felt ever more globally. The second is the likelihood
that, whatever pragmatic outcomes might be reached, these arguments will
persist in pitting individual against collective rights, liberal universalism
against culture, citizens against subjects; if anything, pace the utopian impulses
of liberal multiculturalism, they are liable to reproduce rather than resolve the
paradox of pluralism endemic to neoliberal nationhood. The third is the
mounting tendency for stand-offs between the Kingdom of Custom and the
Constitution to be pursued by legal means, whether in quarrels over rights
among groups or in challenges to the sovereignty of the nation-state and One
Law (see Lazarus-Black and Hirsch, 1994).
54
Inclusions, Exclusions, Conclusions
The mogaga case, in sum, is not in the least exceptional. It is paradigmatic of the
way in which a politics of difference runs up against the limits of liberalism.
Similar conﬂicts are occurring more and more frequently across South Africa
over initiation ritual and occult beliefs, inheritance and succession, corporal
punishment, landholding, and many things besides. Taken together, they point
to the fact that a vernacular praxis is beginning to emerge: in the face of the
confrontation between the Constitution and Culture, and the values for which
they stand, those who seek to assert the sovereignty of things African have
arrived at a series of strategic positions. These are founded on the conviction
that, in spite of a rhetoric of recognition for ‘tradition’, in spite of talk about its
‘liberation’ by accommodation to the common law, the postcolonial state, even
more than its colonial forebear, means to reduce the Kingdom of Custom to a
shadow of its former self: in the argot of neoliberal social management, to make
chiefs into lower order managers in the dispute processing and rural develop-
ment sectors. Also in the sphere of ceremonial, although — as revealed by the
mogaga case, which was concerned with the limitation of chieﬂy rights in the
rites business — ‘ceremony’ tends to be treated nowadays as little more than
powerless pomp. The counter-tactics to which this has given rise range from a
politics of avoidance, through open confrontation, to overt hybridisation.
55 The
ﬁrst was the strategy used, in the end, by Pilane in order to prevent the court
from outlawing mogaga, thus, tacitly, allowing ‘his people’ to insist on its
performance in the future; the second, less common, has been resorted to by
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making cultural conventions compulsory, or for otherwise ﬂouting the law of
the land, thereby to challenge the ANC to put its tolerance to the test. The third
has involved exertions on the part of other rulers to alter those conventions, by
‘tribal’ legislation, just enough to render them acceptable under the Consti-
tution.
56 This tactic is less of a departure from the past than it may seem.
African traditional codes have never been unchanging. Rather, as in the
Euro-American sense of ‘customary law’, they have grown out of an evanes-
cent history of practice — much in the manner espoused for the future by
Justice Sachs (above).
Elsewhere (n.d.) we explore the implications of these and other means of
acting on the conﬂict between liberal governance and the call of custom. What
concerns us here are the implications for citizenship, political being, and
democracy that ﬂow from contradictions inherent in the scaffolding of post-
colonial polities at this historical moment — contradictions observable in
nation-states everywhere, if in locally modulated form. For these contradictions
stem, we argue, from disjunctures of hyphe-nation in the Age of Neoliberalism:
from the ever more problematic relation between the liberal modernist state
and the policultural nation. It is this relation, patently, that has not been
adequately addressed or redressed in contemporary normative philosophy or
social policy.
Our objective, by contrast, is to explain why, despite strenuous and
thoughtful efforts to resolve it, the antinomy persists, why it resists even the
best-intentioned, most capacious politics of tolerance. We have sought, there-
fore, to make sense of the way in which struggles over culture in post-apart-
heid South Africa have emerged from a concrete, ongoing history of difference,
a history that has edged uneasily from Tutu’s excoriation of ethnicity to
Maduna’s plea for the necessity of its recognition. It is a history that sheds light
on the generic vicissitudes of the life and times of the nation-state at the turn
of the new century. For, as they face the forces of global capital, postcolonial
societies like this one have come to replicate features of ‘late’ liberal polities
elsewhere, especially in respect of the challenge posed to democratic rule by
activism in the name of identity. But the postcolony also makes evident critical
differences in the politics of difference, in struggles that do not merely strive
for inclusion within state institutions, but contest the very sovereignty of those
institutions: their constituent forms of politics, citizenship, and democracy,
their monopoly over the law and the means of violence. Because of this, these
struggles are inadequately grasped by liberal terms like ‘minority rights’ or
‘multiculturalism’. For the policultural activity they embody is born of, and
sustained by, the limits of liberalism: the limited ability, in South Africa, of the
newly-democratic state to produce a uniﬁed nation amidst the intensifying
ﬂow of signs, goods, and people across its borders; the limited capacity of its
hegemonic discourse to frame an ideology to counter ID-ology and the cen-
trifugal claims of diversity; the limited power of its Constitution to make actual
the entitlements it guarantees; the limited capability of its instruments of
governance to reconcile the equality it promises its citizens with the stark
disparities of life in an increasingly deregulated economy.
It is these limits that reproduce the tensions between the philosophical466 Jean and John Comaroff
tenets of universalism and the practical realities of difference, between the
abstract language of individual rights and the vernacular sentiments of collec-
tive identity, between the truth-claims of citizenship and the true-life experi-
ence of ethnic subjecthood; the tensions, that is, which shape the everyday
politics of culture, and which erupt intermittently into dramatic confrontations
like the one between Elizabeth Tumane and the Kgatla Tribal Authority. The
fact that such conﬂicts are litigated, and that the case brought against the
Kingdom of Custom was framed in terms of the plaintiff’s rights to citizenship,
is no accident. The growing salience of the law — in fact, the legalisation of
politics tout court — is, for reasons that we have made plain, an integral feature
of the neoliberal moment. Even in contesting the sovereignty of the state,
traditional authorities have no choice but to engage it in jural terms: in the
idiom of rights, constitutionalism, and due process. But, in arguing both with
and through the law, advocates of difference are having an impact on its ways
and meanings — by, among other things, forcing it to fashion a jurisprudence
that can deal with culture without criminalising it.
It is in such cases, too, that the shape of a new popular politics is
discernable, a politics that is catching ﬂame as older struggles — under the
signs of class, race, and partisan ideology — fade away. This may not be the
kind of politics, the sort of dialectic, that critical theorists might have chosen;
it does not, after all, address some of the more profound moral and material
forces shaping the lives of contemporary South Africans. Or others elsewhere.
But it is a politics nonetheless, a politics that is yielding new styles of activism,
new forms of subjectivity, and new sites of history-in-the-making. In post-
colonies and in the world at large.
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Notes
1. The statement, ﬁrst made in an article written for the African-American
Institute, is published in Tutu, 1984, p. 121. It has been much quoted; for
just two recent examples, see Lijphart, 1995, p. 281, and Oomen, 2002, p. 6.
2. ‘Revisit Cultural Values’, Zandile Nkutha, Sowetan,1 7November 1999, p. 2.
Maduna made the statement in an address to a conference on constitution-
alism; his audience included leaders of the South African Development
Community (SADC).Citizenship and Difference in South Africa 467
3. Elsewhere (e.g. 1997a) we have sought to problematise the concept of
tradition and, by extension, of ‘traditional’ leadership; we deploy the term
here strictly to refer to vernacular usage. ‘Traditional leadership’ has
become a generic label in South Africa for all forms of indigenous African
rule.
4. ‘Ideology is Dead, Long Live ID-ology’, Rapule Tabane and Ferial Haffajee,
Mail & Guardian,2 7June–3 July 2003, p. 6.
5. For just one recent account in the print media, see ‘Boeremag, Pagad Still
Threaten SA Security’, Jeremy Michaels, Cape Times,1 8June 2003, p. 4.
Pagad, ‘People Against Guns and Drugs’, a Muslim organisation, arose in
Cape Town in the 1990s to deal with rising levels of violence and alleged
police neglect. It has, in turn, been accused of promoting a reign of urban
terror.
6. The most notable case is that of Mapogo a Mathamaga, a large organisation
led by Monhle Magolego, about whom much has been written (see
Comaroff and Comaroff, n.d., Chapter 9). In an interview with us at
Acornhoek on 11 March 2000, Magolego, who has been indicted several
times, insisted that the justice carried out by his cadres was ‘the African
way of stopping crime’ and was inﬂicted ‘with the cooperation of local
chiefs’.
7. See Ralushai et al., 1996, p. 31 for ﬁgures on the early 1990s in the Northern
Province, now Limpopo, where witch-burnings were most prevalent. In the
ﬁrst half of 1996 in that province, 676 people were killed; see ‘Northern
Province Targets ‘Witch’ Killers, Weekly Mail & Guardian,2 7September-3
October 1996, electronic edition.
8. Questions have been raised about the constitutional status of the Unit and
its training programs: they appear to presume the illegality and Satanic
inspiration of the cultural convictions of many citizens. See, e.g. ‘Occult-Re-
lated Killings on the Rise’, Cape Argus,9September 1998, p. 9; ‘Police Devil
Busters Under Threat’, Daily Mail & Guardian,2 8March 1999.
9. Prince v. The President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope and others,
CCT 36/00.
10. ‘Top Politicians for Witchcraft Summit’, Cape Argus,7September 1999, p. 9.
11. Of course, it is easier, politically, for the state to ignore the ‘minority’
cultural claims of Khoe-San, Coloureds, and Afrikaners.
12. But not all. Nelson Mandela, for one, has — famously — always shown
great respect for traditional leadership and for the political processes
associated with it; see his autobiography (Mandela, 1994).
13. Govan Mbeki (1964) once said that, ‘when a people have developed to a
stage which discards chieftainship … then to force it on them
is … enslavement’. This statement has been widely quote; see, e.g., ‘The
Chieftancy System is Rooted in Apartheid’, Lungisile Ntsebeza and Fred
Hendricks, Crossﬁre, Mail & Guardian, 18–24 February 2000, p. 33.
14. Traditional Leadership and Governance Draft White Paper (Gazette 23984,
Notice 2103), 29 October 2002. The document can be read at www.gov.za/
gazette/whitepaper/2002/23894.pdf.
15. This is a virtual paraphrase of the Local Government: Municipal Structures468 Jean and John Comaroff
Amendment Bill, 2000. It may be read at www.pmg.org.za/bills/munici-
palstructures2ndamd.htm.
16. ‘The Chieftancy System is Rooted in Apartheid’, Lungisile Ntsebeza and
Fred Hendricks, Crossﬁre, Mail & Guardian, 18–24 February 2000, p. 33.
17. A National Conference on Traditional Leadership, Eskom Conference Centre,
Midrand, 17–18 August 2000, Department of Provincial and Local Govern-
ment. We attended the conference on the formal invitation of the Minister
for Provincial and Local Government, the Hon. F.S. Mufamadi, and wish to
thank him and the staff of his Ministry for making our presence possible.
18. The conference was preceded by, and organised around, a Draft Discussion
Document Towards a White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Institutions
issued by the Department of Provincial and Local Government on 11 April
2000.
19. These were the words of Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Inkatha
Freedom Party, in a speech made to rally Zulu support in the ‘ﬁght for
autonomy of the[ir] kingdom’; see ‘Unite Against ANC Treachery —
Buthelezi’, Mawande Jubasi and Thabo Mkhize, Sunday Times,4August
2002, p. 4.
20. ‘The Chieftancy System is Rooted in Apartheid’, Lungisile Ntsebeza and
Fred Hendricks, Crossﬁre, Mail & Guardian, 18–24 February 2000, p. 33.
21. Act 108 of 1996 as adopted on 8 May and amended on 11 October by the
Constitutional Assembly.
22. ‘Constitutional Tower of Babel’, Goloa Moiloa, Sunday World,3 1October
1999, p. 16.
23. Transcript is from the Supreme Court of Appeal, Mildred Hleziphi Mthembu
v. Henryk Letsela,3 0May 2000 (Case No: 71/98), as downloaded from
www.law.wits.ac.za/sca/scadate.html, pp. 31–32.
24. See ‘Customary Law Undermines Constitutional Rights’, Khadija Ma-
gardie, Mail & Guardian, 15–22 June 2000, p. 33.
25. ‘Customary Law in the Dock’, Fatima Schroeder, Cape Times,1 9June 2003,
p. 5. Judgment on the case was still pending at the time of writing.
26. Justice Mokgoro has written on the topic as well; see Mokgoro (1994) for
her early views.
27. Much the same point was made just before the U.K. parliamentary elec-
tions of 2001: ‘[W]ith a basically pre-set macroeconomic framework,
government becomes a matter … ultimately of microeconomic manage-
ment. [Labour] is set to be elected as managers of Her Majesty’s Public
Sector, plc’. See ‘Whatever Happened to Big Economics’, Faisal Islam, The
Observer (London), 3 June 2001, Business Section, p. 3.
28. Vide,i nthis respect, McMichael’s (1998, p. 113) suggestion that the ‘citizen
state’ has been replaced by the ‘consumer state’. See also Hegeman (1991,
p. 72) who argues that identity, at all levels, has come to be deﬁned by
consumption (see also Vanderbilt, 1997, p. 141); not merely by the con-
sumption of objects, but also by the consumption of the past.
29. The argument summarised in this paragraph was ﬁrst developed, and is
more extensively stated, in J.L. Comaroff (1998); it is also to be found, in
reﬁned form, in Comaroff and Comaroff (2000).Citizenship and Difference in South Africa 469
30. The train is operated by Legal i, a Section 21 (i.e. a non-proﬁt) Company
with a Board of Directors representative of the Law Societies, the Black
Lawyers Association, the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, and
Consumer Agencies.
31. Such critics span the political spectrum from radical (e.g. Dirlik, 1990) to
conservative. One British ‘View from the right’, Minette Marrin, The
Guardian (U.K.), 29 May 2001, p. 7, puts it thus: ‘[W]hat we must have to
live together in harmony is a tolerant, over-arching common culture’. But
the very idea of such a culture is ‘denounced by multiculturalists as
supremacist and racist’.
32. ‘Clash of Custom, Constitution’, The Mail,3 1July 1998, p. 17.
33. Tribal Authorities are ofﬁcially recognised administrative bodies made up
of chiefs and chieﬂy advisors. Instituted by the apartheid regime as part of
the system of ‘homeland’ governance, they were explicitly modelled on an
African political institution that endures in many rural areas.
34. Case no. 618/98, in the High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana
Provincial Division), p. 3.
35. ‘Women Present Memo to the Chief’, The Mail,3 0June 1995, p. 3.
36. Case No. 618/98, in the High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana
Provincial Division), Founding Afﬁdavit, p. 3.
37. Interviews with Advocate Pansy Tlakula, 19 July 2000, Simon Ruthwane,
20 July 2000, Reginald Mpame, 10 July 2000, and Elizabeth Tlhoaele, 24 July
2000..
38. Answering Afﬁdavit, Nyalala Molefe John Pilane, 13 November 1998, Case
No. 618/98, in the High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana Provincial
Division), p. 28.
39. The HRC is an independent Commission set up under the terms of the
Constitution to investigate possible violations of its terms.
40. Case No. 618/98, in the High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana
Provincial Division), Founding Afﬁdavit, pp. 5–6.
41. The speaker was introduced as Paramount Chief of the Kgatla,; this despite
the fact that, while Tswana chiefdoms recognise an order of ritual seniority
among their rulers, they have never had paramount chiefs per se.
Paramountcy has been claimed from time to time, however, for political
purposes.
42. Advocate Pansy Tlakula (personal communication).
43. Case No. 618/98, in the High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana
Provincial Division), Founding Afﬁdavit, p. 6.
44. Pilane’s communication, here, is multiply resonant. At this point in his
reply, Pilane invoked a hallowed aphorism: kgosi ke kgosi ka morafe,achief
is chief by [with] the people.
45. Letter from Kgosi Nyalala M.J. Pilane to M.C. Moodliar, Human Rights
Commission, 29 June 1998. Item B4 attached to the case record of the
Bophuthatswana High Court.
46. ‘Clash of Custom, Constitution’, The Mail,3 1July 1998, p. 17. Other
resonances are at work here. House arrest was commonly used by the
apartheid government to silence its opponents; its invocation by Mrs470 Jean and John Comaroff
Tumane associates the actions of the Tribal Authority with the tactics of the
ancien regime.
47. Member of the Executive Council of the House of Representatives of the
North West Province. MECs are the heads of provincial government
departments.
48. ‘Clash of Custom, Constitution’, The Mail,3 1July 1998, p. 17.
49. Answering Afﬁdavit, Nyalala Molefe John Pilane, 13 November 1998, Case
No. 618/98, in the High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana Division);
all our citations in this paragraph are from pp. 7–10.
50. Constitutionalism has been a feature of independent African churches from
their inception (J. Comaroff, 1974; Sundkler, 1961). But its centrality in the
new South Africa to popular notions of organizational legitimacy has given
church constitutions new salience.
51. See the statement made to this effect by Advocate Tlakula during the debate
on the case in the North West House of Traditional Leaders; ‘Clash of
Custom, Constitution’, The Mail,3 1July 1998, p. 17. According to Tlakula
(personal communication), she told the chiefs that the matter rested with
them: either they would reform their traditions or the matter would be
taken out of their hands.
52. Answering Afﬁdavit, Nyalala Molefe John Pilane, 13 November 1998, Case
No. 618/98, in the High Court of South Africa (Bophuthatswana Division),
p. 19.
53. ‘Clash of Custom, Constitution’, The Mail,3 1July 1998, p. 17.
54. In this regard it seems clear that, while they have increasingly been drawn
into such litigation, traditional rulers feel relatively disadvantaged by its
terms. Pilane and other royals publicly expressed the view that the mogaga
case should have been conducted elsewhere than in the High Court. In their
view, African authority, metonymically enshrined in the chiefship and
chieﬂy courts, ought to be constitutionally recognised. Hence the insistence,
at the Midrand Conference on Traditional Leadership and Institutions (see
above) that the Constitution be amended to recognise their sovereignty.
55. Contrary to some formulations (see Modood 2000, p. 177), we use ‘hybrid-
isation’ not as an analytic concept but as a descriptive term for one among
many self-conscious strategies deployed to address the paradox of differ-
ence here. We do not see the concept, conventionally understood, as
providing an adequately theorised account of processes of this nature.
56. There are, of course, ‘traditional’ practices that chiefs have themselves
banished, on grounds of one or another principle, in order to address social
and political transformations. Nor is this a purely postcolonial phenom-
enon. Schapera (1943, 1970) has documented the history of vernacular
legislation and legal innovation among various Tswana groupings; see also
Comaroff and Roberts (1977).
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